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Symmetric and Asymmetric Committees 
 
This paper studies the assignment of decision makers to two committees that make decisions 
by a simple majority rule. There is an even number of decision makers at each of various skill 
levels and each committee has an odd number of members. Surprisingly, even with the 
symmetric assumptions in the spirit of Condorcet, a symmetric composition of committees is 
not always optimal. In other words, decision makers with different skill levels should not 
generally be evenly divided among the committees. However, in the special case of only two 
skill levels, it is optimal to compose the committees evenly. 
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 1 Introduction
Committee decision making under uncertainty commonly occurs in such ﬁelds as manage-
ment, law, and medicine where organizations need to make decisions on whether to accept
or reject various proposals. Typical examples include a ﬁrm that has to decide whether an
investment project should be carried out or not, a university that must make an acceptance
or rejection decision for each applicant, and a court system that has to determine the guilt
or innocence of each defendant. To decide which of two possible states of the world occurs,
an organization may employ decision makers who will strive to make the optimal decision
for the organization on each proposal.1 Due to private information, however, the decision
makers may have diﬀerent judgements about the true state of the world.2 Presumably,
therefore, a committee of decision makers that aggregates their individual assessments is
more likely to make the correct decision than would any single individual.3
There are many reasons why an organization may need to appoint diﬀerent committees
that work in parallel and independently decide on each of the proposals assigned to it (e.g.,
the time involved in examining the merits of each proposal or the geographic dispersion of
the relevant activities). It is therefore surprising that the extensive literature on committee
decision making always assumes a given composition of committees and never considers the
question of how the decision makers are allocated to the committees.
An important component of our model is that the decision makers may diﬀer in their
1 Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) assume that the interests of the decision makers do not necessarily
coincide with those of the organization and study how to assign committee members who advocate special
interests.
2 See, for example, Sah and Stiglitz (1985) and Sah (1991).
3 The idea that “two good men are better than one” can be traced back to Aristotle (350 BCE). The
English proverb “two heads are better than one” is ﬁrst recorded in Heywood (1546). A formal analysis of
the aggregational aspects of committee decision making goes back to Condorcet (1785). His approach has
been further developed by, among others, Grofman and Feld (1988), Young (1988), and Ladha (1995). On
the other hand, Feddersen and Pesendorfer (1998) show that strategic voting considerations may reduce the
probability that the unanimity rule leads to correct decisions. See also Campbell (1999) and Palfrey and
Rosenthal (1983, 1985) who show that under certain circumstances a majority may be less likely to win than
a minority.
1ability to identify the true state of the world, which makes the assignment of decision makers
into the diﬀerent committees a nontrivial problem. The committees work in parallel and
the organization divides the decision makers between the committees in order to maximize
the average probability (over committees and proposals) of making correct decisions.4 We
focus on the case in which there is symmetry both between the committees and between the
alternatives. The symmetry between the committees means that the two committees have
the same size and decide on the same number of independent proposals, while the symmetry
between the alternatives means that the prior probability of each state is a half for every
proposal, that each decision maker’s ability to identify the correct state of the world is the
same for both states, and that the net beneﬁt to the organization from making a correct
decision is the same for each proposal and state. Ours is a common value model where the
decision makers share the organization’s objective but have private information. Each com-
mittee member can vote either for or against a proposal,5 and the committees use a simple
majority rule to make the collective decision. With our assumptions, informative voting
(meaning that committee members vote according to their true assessment) constitutes a
Nash equilibrium behavior.6 Thus, we assume that committee members vote informatively.
Assuming that there is an even number of decision makers at each skill level, any combi-
nation of committees can be obtained from symmetric committees by an exchange of decision
members between the committees. In Theorem 1 we show that starting from symmetric com-
4 Early studies of optimal committee decision rules with binary alternatives include Grofman et al. (1983),
Nitzan and Paroush (1982), and Shapley and Grofman (1984). More general models include Ben-Yashar and
Nitzan (1997) and Ben-Yashar and Kraus (2002). These papers all assume that there is a single committee
and that the objective is to maximize the average probability that the committee makes the correct decision.
See also Baharad and Nitzan (2007).
5 We do not consider abstentions. Presumably, the organization would not employ decision makers with
so little ability that it would be optimal for them not to participate in the decision making, i.e., abstain.
B¨ orgers (2004) presents a symmetric private value model in which abstentions are optimal due to a cost of
voting.
6 The reason is that the probability that any particular committee member is pivotal is the same in
situations where the correct decision is to accept the proposal as in situations where the correct decision is
to reject it. See Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) and Ben-Yashar and Milchtaich (2007).
2mittees, an exchange of decision makers with one skill level in one committee for the same
number of decision makers with another skill level from the other committee reduces the
average probability of making correct decisions. However, in Theorem 2 we show that start-
ing from symmetric committees, an exchange of decision makers with diﬀerent skill levels in
one committee with decision makers with other skill levels from the other committee may
increase the average probability of making correct decisions.
The intuition of Theorem 1 is that the more higher skilled committee members there
are, the less likely it is that a particular higher skilled member is pivotal. Therefore, the
probability that a simple majority makes the correct decision increases at a decreasing rate
with the number of decision makers of the same higher skill level that are replacing decision
makers with the same lower skill level. As a consequence, in the special case of only two
types of decision makers, symmetric committees are optimal.
The surprising result in Theorem 2 is due to the interaction of decision makers with
more than two skill levels. The eﬀect on the average probability that a committee makes the
correct decision if some of the decision makers that have diﬀerent skill levels are replaced by
the same number of decision makers that have other skill levels is ambiguous and depends on
the skill levels of both the replaced decision makers and the decision makers remaining in the
committee. Accordingly, even with the symmetry assumptions in the spirit of Condorcet,
a symmetric composition of committees is generally not optimal. That is, decision makers
with diﬀerent skill levels should not generally be evenly divided among the committees.
To illustrate that asymmetric committees may be optimal, suppose that the organization
employs ten decision makers with two decision makers at each of ﬁve diﬀerent skill levels
as deﬁned by the probabilities of making the correct assessment. Suppose also that the
probabilities of making the correct assessment of a proposal are 0.9, 0.75, 0.74, 0.72, and
0.6, respectively, for the ﬁve skill levels. We now compare the asymmetric case in which one
committee has decision makers with the probabilities 0.9, 0.9, 0.74, 0.6, and 0.6 of making
the correct assessment, and the other committee has decision makers with the probabilities
30.75, 0.75, 0.74, 0.72, and 0.72 of making the correct assessment with the symmetric case in
which the decision makers are evenly distributed among the two committees (i.e., in both
committees there is one decision maker at each level of probability of making the correct
assessment). As we will see, the average probability of making the correct decisions is higher
for asymmetric committees than for symmetric committees.
In this example, the asymmetric committees are obtained from symmetric committees by
exchanging a pair of decision makers with skill levels 0.9 and 0.6 with a pair of decision makers
with skill levels 0.75 and 0.72 between the two committees. Since 0.9 ∗ 0.6 = 0.75 ∗ 0.72,
the probability that the committees make the correct decision are unaﬀected by the case in
which all the exchanged decision makers make the correct assessment. Hence, the exchange of
decision makers can be of beneﬁt only in the case that exactly one of the exchanged decision
makers in each pair makes the correct assessment. Now, the diﬀerence in the probability
that exactly one decision maker in a pair with skill levels 0.9 and 0.6 and the probability that
exactly one decision maker in a pair with skill levels 0.75 and 0.72 make the correct decision
is 0.9 + 0.6 − 0.75 − 0.72. In order to make a diﬀerence it is also required that exactly two
of the three remaining decision makers with skill levels 0.9, 0.6, and 0.74 in one committee,
and exactly two of the three remaining decision makers with skill levels 0.75, 0.72, and 0.74
in the other committee make the correct assessment. The latter requires that exactly one
of the decision makers with skill levels 0.9 and 0.6 as well as one of the decision makers
with skill levels 0.75 and 0.72 make the correct assessment. It follows that the diﬀerence in
the probabilities that the asymmetric committees and the symmetric committees make the
correct decisions is 1
2 (0.9 + 0.6 − 0.75 − 0.72)
2 ∗0.74 = 3.33 ×10−4. Consequently, it is not
optimal to divide the decision makers evenly between the committees.
2 The Model
We consider an organization that needs to make binary decisions on whether to accept or
reject each of various independent proposals. The correct decision for a particular proposal
4depends on which of two states of the world is relevant for this proposal, but the actual state
is unknown to the organization at the time the decision must be made. The prior probability
of each state of the world is half for each proposal. The net beneﬁt to the organization from
each correct decision is identical for all proposals.
Due to the large number of proposals or coordination problems, the organization divides
the proposals evenly among two independent committees. Each committee consists of an
odd number N ≥ 3 of decision makers who are responsible for deciding whether each of the
proposals assigned to the committee should be accepted or rejected.
While the decision makers identify with the objectives of the organization, they diﬀer in
their ability to identify the state of the world that is relevant for each proposal. A decision
maker’s ability to identify the state of the world can be represented by the probability
that he makes the correct assessment of a proposal. We assume that the organization
employs decision makers with s ≥ 2 diﬀerent skill levels as deﬁned by the probabilities that
the decision makers assess a proposal correctly. Speciﬁcally, for i = 1,2,...,s, let Ni be a
positive and even number of decision makers who assess a proposal correctly with probability
pi, where
￿s
i=1 Ni = 2N, 1
2 < pi < 1 ∀i, and pi ￿= pj ∀i ￿= j. A decision maker’s ability to
make the correct assessment is the same in the two states. Furthermore, his assessment of
a proposal is independent of his assessment of any other proposal and of the other decision
makers’ assessments.
Within a committee, each member expresses his true assessment by voting “yes” to a
proposal that the member thinks should be adopted, and “no” to one he thinks should be
rejected. Each committee’s collective decision on each proposal is determined by a simple
majority rule. Now, let G(n1,...,ns) denote the probability that the committee makes the
correct decision by a simple majority rule, where ni ≥ 0 is the number of committee members
with skill level pi and
￿s
i=1 ni = N. The objective of the organization is to maximize the
average probability of making correct decisions. Therefore, the organization chooses how
many decision makers at each skill level to allocate to each committee in order to maximize
51
2[G(n1,...,ns) + G(N1 − n1,...,Ns − ns)].
3 Symmetric Committees
Let N denote a proﬁle of N decision makers. Also, let Nivjw denote the proﬁle of N +v+w
decision makers if, starting from N, the number of decision makers with skill level pi is
increased by v and the number of decision makers with skill level pj ￿= pi is increased by w,
where v and w are integers. Furthermore, let Γ↑(M,N) denote the probability that at least
M decision makers in N make the correct assessment, and Γ(M,N) denote that exactly M



















denote the change in the probability that a simple majority makes the correct decision if,
starting with a committee of decision makers with proﬁleNivj−v, one decision maker with
skill level pi replaces one with skill level pj. We now prove that the change in the probability
decreases (increases) with the number of decision makers with the skill level pi (pj) already
in the committee:
Lemma 1: ∆[(N + 1)/2,Nivj−v] decreases in v.
Proof: The only case in which the exchange of a decision maker with skill level pi with
a decision maker with skill level pj can make a diﬀerence in the committee’s decision is if
the exchanged decision maker happens to be pivotal; that is, if the rest of the committee
members are divided evenly for and against the proposal. We therefore ﬁrst derive an
expression for ∆[(N + 1)/2,Nivj−v] in terms of the probability that the exchanged decision
maker is pivotal.
The probability that in a committee with proﬁle Niv+1j−v−1 of decision makers, at least




















Similarly, the probability that in a committee with proﬁle Nivj−v of decision makers, at least




















It follows that in a committee with proﬁle Nivj−v of decision makers, the change in the




























where pi − pj is the change in the probability that the exchanged decision maker makes the
correct assessment and Γ[(N − 1)/2,Nivj−v−1] is the probability that the exchanged decision
maker is pivotal.
By substituting v + 1 in place of v in the above formula, we obtain that the change in
the probability of making the correct decision due to the change of decision makers in a














Accordingly, the change in the probability of making the correct decision caused by exchang-
ing the decision makers in a committee with proﬁle Niv+1j−v−1 less the corresponding change




























The term in the square brackets is the probability that the exchanged decision maker is piv-
otal in a committee where the other members have the proﬁle Niv+1j−v−2, less the probability
that the exchanged decision maker is pivotal in a committee with one less decision maker

























































which is negative since Γ[(N − 3)/2,Nivj−v−2] < Γ[(N − 1)/2,Nivj−v−2].
As a consequence, ∆[(N + 1)/2,Nivj−v] decreases in v; that is, the change in the prob-
ability of the committee making the correct decision when one decision maker with skill
level pi replaces a decision maker with skill level pj (and all the other committee members
are unchanged) is a decreasing function of the number of decision makers with skill level pi
already in the committee. ￿
The intuition of Lemma 1 is that the higher (lower) the skill levels of N − 1 committee
members, the less (more) likely it is that the Nth member is pivotal. Suppose that a
8decision maker with a higher skill level replaces a decision maker with a lower skill level.
The change in the probability that a simple majority makes the correct decision is positive,
and it increases at a decreasing rate with the number of committee members with the same
higher skill level who are already in the committee. Suppose instead that a decision maker
with a lower skill level replaces a decision maker with a higher skill level. Since adding a
decision maker with a lower skill level is equivalent to subtracting a decision maker with
a higher skill level, the change in the probability that a simple majority makes the correct
decision is negative and its absolute value increases at a increasing rate with the number of
committee members with the same lower skill level who are already in the committee.
We now establish that it is not optimal for an organization to divide all but two types of
decision makers evenly among the committees. Let ￿ N = (N1/2,N2/2,...,Ns/2) denote the
proﬁle of the decision makers in a symmetric committee with N members.





G( ￿ Nivj−v) + G( ￿ Ni−vjv)
￿

















with respect to v. If one decision maker with skill level pi is moved to the committee with
￿ Nivj−v from the committee with ￿ Ni−vjv in lieu of a decision maker with skill level pj that
















































9Since Lemma 1 shows that ∆
￿
(N + 1)/2, ￿ Nivj−v
￿
decreases in v and that
∆
￿
(N + 1)/2, ￿ Ni−v−1jv+1
￿
increases in v, it follows that (2) decreases in v. As Lemma 1 also


































it follows that the maximum value of 1
2
￿
G( ￿ Nivj−v) + G( ￿ Ni−vjv)
￿
is obtained for only v = 0.
￿
Accordingly, starting with two symmetric committees, it is never optimal to reassign
decision makers with two skill levels so that decision makers with one skill level in one
committee are exchanged for the same number of decision makers with the other skill level
in the other committee. Hence, if for some exogenous reason decision makers of only two
skill levels have to be added to or removed from symmetric committees and the organization
is not able to move any of the existing decision makers from one committee to the other,
then the added or removed decision makers have to be divided evenly so that the changed
committees are also symmetric.
Corollary 1: If s = 2, symmetric committees are uniquely optimal.
Proof: If s = 2, then ￿ Nivj−v = (N1/2 + v,N2/2 − v) and ￿ Ni−vjv = (N1/2 − v,N2/2 + v)
so that the proﬁles of the decision makers in the two committees depend only on v. Since
Theorem 1 shows that ￿ Nivj−v and ￿ Ni−vjv, v ￿= 0, is not optimal, it follows that v = 0 is
uniquely optimal. ￿
Thus, if there are only two types of decision makers, i.e., high-skilled and low-skilled, it
is optimal for the organization to allocate the two types evenly so that the compositions of
10the committees are symmetric. That is, regardless of the relative numbers of the decision
makers with the two skill levels, each committee should have the same number of high- and
low-skilled decision makers.
Suppose that decision makers can have only two skill levels. One implication of Corollary
1 is that if the decision makers are divided optimally among the two committees, and the
organization is then faced with a need to change the size of the committees by either adding
or removing the same number of decision makers from each committee, the new optimal
allocation of decision members can be obtained without the organization having to move any
decision maker from one committee to the other. In other words, suppose that the allocation
of decision makers is sequential, i.e., the division of the decision makers among the two
committees takes place in steps such that an even number of makers are ﬁrst divided among
the two committees, then an additional even number of decision makers are divided among
the same two committees without moving any of the already allocated decision makers, etc.
Corollary 1 then implies that this can be done such that, at each step, the average probability
of making the correct decisions is maximized for the committee size at that step.
With two types of decision makers, one possible application of our model is to a court
system. To illustrate, suppose that all cases are tried by a panel of judges and that a judge
can be classiﬁed as either junior or senior, with the latter being higher skilled (due to more
expertise and experience on the bench) than the former. A pertinent question would then
be how to allocate judges to the diﬀerent courts so as to maximize the number of correct
decisions. Corollary 1 shows that it would be ineﬃcient to have some panels consisting of
only junior judges and others of only senior judges. Rather, it would be optimal that junior
and senior judges be distributed evenly over the diﬀerent courts.
Corollary 2: If s = 3 and Ni = 2 ∀i, symmetric committees are uniquely optimal.
Proof: If s = 3, an asymmetric committee will have two decision makers of one type,
one decision maker of another type, and no decision maker of the last type. Therefore, all
11the asymmetric committees can be obtained from symmetric committees by v = 1. Since
Theorem 1 shows that v = 1 is not optimal, it follows that v = 0 and hence that the
symmetric committees are uniquely optimal. ￿
The underlying logic is that, starting with an even distribution of decision makers, any
composition of two three-member committees can be obtained by a single reassignment of
one decision maker from one committee to the other. The reason is that the reassignment
of two members from each committee to the other is equivalent, in terms of the composition
of the committees, to the reassignment of one member from each committee to the other.7
4 Asymmetric Committees
If there are more than two skill levels and more than three members in each committee, then
the committees should generally not be symmetric. Indeed, Theorem 2 will establish that
starting with an even division of decision makers among the two committees, a reassignment
that involves decision makers with more than two skill levels may increase the average prob-
ability that the committees make the right decisions. In that case, symmetric committees
are not optimal. The reason is that, in contrast to the assumption of Lemma 1, starting from
an even distribution of decision makers among the committees, it is necessary to exchange
decision makers with more than two skill levels between the committees in order to obtain
7 Let pi, pj, and pk denote the three skill levels. The average probability of making the correct decisions
is
pipj + pipk + pjpk − 2pipjpk
if the committees are symmetric, and
1
2(p2
j + 2pipj − 2pip2
j + p2
k + 2pipk − 2pip2
k)
if the committees are asymmetric. Hence, the former exceeds the latter by
pipj + pipk + pjpk − 2pipjpk − 1
2(p2
j + 2pipj − 2pip2
j + p2
k + 2pipk − 2pip2
k)
= (pi − 1
2)(pj − pk)2
> 0.
12some of the possible allocations of decision makers with diﬀerent skill levels to the commit-
tees. In general, such an exchange does not cause a decrease in the average probability that
the committees will make the correct decision.
To prove that asymmetric committees may be optimal, we examine cases in which, start-
ing with symmetric committees, two decision makers in one committee are exchanged with
two decision makers in the other committee.8 For simplicity, therefore, assume that there
are ﬁve diﬀerent skill levels with two decision makers at each of the four skill levels and two
or more decision makers at the ﬁfth skill level. Let the four skill levels with two decision
makers in each be denoted by pi, pj, pk, and p￿, and the ﬁfth skill level by p. In this case ￿ N
denotes the proﬁle of decision makers with ni = nj = nk = n￿ = 1 and N −4 decision makers
with skill level p. Further, let ￿ Nivjwkx￿y denote the proﬁle of N + v + w + x + y decision
makers if, starting from ￿ N, the number of decision makers with skill level pi, pj, pk, and p￿
are increased by v, w, x, and y, respectively, where v, w, x, and y are integers. Finally, let
a ≡ pkp￿ − pipj be the probability that a pair of decision makers with skill levels pk and p￿
both make the correct assessment less the probability that a pair of decision makers with
skill levels pi and pj both make the correct assessment. Also, let b ≡ pk + p￿ − pi − pj so
that b − a is the probability that at least one of the decision makers in a pair with skill
levels pk and p￿ makes the correct assessment less the probability that at least one of the
decision makers in a pair with skill levels pi and pj makes the correct assessment. Note that
if a = 0 (b = 0), the skill levels of the two pairs of decision makers have the same geometric
(arithmetic) means. Furthermore, a = 0 ⇒ b ￿= 0 and b = 0 ⇒ a ￿= 0.9
8 All possible compositions of the committees can be obtained from symmetric committees by reassigning
at most (N − 1)/2 decision makers from one committee to the other (as already explained for the case of
N = 3). In the case of N = 5, therefore, it suﬃces to consider at most two reassignments.
9 Since a = 0 implies that
bpi = pipk + pip￿ − p2
i − pkp￿
= (pi − p￿)(pk − pi),
it follows that a = b = 0 is infeasible because it would require that pi = p￿ and pj = pk or that pi = pk and
pj = p￿.
13The average probability of making the correct decision with asymmetric committees of
decision makers having proﬁles ￿ Ni−1j−1k1￿1 and ￿ Ni1j1k−1￿−1 less the average probability of



































































































































































The expression in the ﬁrst square brackets is the diﬀerence between the probability that
there are exactly (N −3)/2 correct assessments being made by decision makers with proﬁle
Ni−1j−1 and with proﬁle Nk−1￿−1. Therefore, the ﬁrst expression in (3) is the change in the
average probability that the committees make the correct decisions if the exchanged decision
makers both make the correct assessment in order for the committee to decide correctly.
14The expression in the second square brackets in (3) is the diﬀerence between the proba-
bility that there are exactly (N − 1)/2 correct assessments being made by decision makers
with proﬁle ￿ Ni−1j−1 and with proﬁle ￿ Nk−1￿−1. Accordingly, the second expression in (3) is
the change in the average probability that the committees make the correct decision if at
least one of the exchanged decision makers make the correct assessment in order for the
committee to decide correctly.
Consider now the case when N = 5. Suppose that the products of the exchanged decision
makers’ skill levels are the same so that a = pkp￿−pipj = 0. The diﬀerence in the probability
that at least one correct assessment is being made by the exchanged decision makers is
then equal to the diﬀerence in the sums of the exchanged decision makers’ skill levels, i.e.,
b = pk + p￿ − pi − pj. At the same time, the diﬀerence in the probability that two correct
assessments are being made by the three decision makers remaining in the committees is
equal to the diﬀerence in the sums of the exchanged decision makers’ skill levels times the
ﬁfth decision maker’s skill level, i.e., bp.10 Accordingly, the diﬀerence between the average
probability of making the correct decision with asymmetric and symmetric committees (i.e.,
expression (3)) is 1
2 times the product of b and bp,and, since b2 > 0, it is positive. That is,
if a = 0, then a symmetric committee is not optimal.
We now provide more general conditions under which symmetric committees are not
optimal:
Theorem 2: If ab ≤ 0 and p < 1
2 + 1/(N − 3), optimal committees are asymmetric.
Proof: Let N ≡ ￿ Ni−1j−1k−1￿−1. The Appendix shows that (3) can be written as











































First, suppose that N = 5. Then p < 1


















0, it follows that (4) is equal to
1
2 [a(2b − 3a)(1 − p) + (3a2 + b2 − 4ab)p]
= 1
2 [(3a2 − 2ab)(2p − 1) + (b2 − 2ab)p].
Thus, if a = 0, then (4) is equal to 1
2b2p > 0, while if b = 0, then (4) is equal to 3a2(p− 1
2) > 0.
Furthermore, if ab < 0, then 3a2 − 2ab > 0 and b2 − 2ab > 0 so that (4) is positive. This
completes the proof for N = 5.













































which is positive since p < 1
2 + 1/(N − 3).














































































which is positive since p < 1
2 + 1/(N − 3) ⇒ (p − 1
2)2 < 3/[4(N − 2)].
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which has the same sign as 3/[4(N − 2)] − (p − 1














> 0. Since ab < 0 ⇒ a2,−2ab,b2 − 2ab > 0, it follows that (4) is positive.
This completes the proof for N ≥ 7. ￿
17Even though our model assumes symmetry between the committees (they have the same
size and make the same number of independent decisions) and between the alternatives (the
prior probability and a decision maker’s ability are independent of the state, and the net
beneﬁt of a correct decision is identical for each proposal and state), it is not always optimal
to divide the decision makers into symmetric committees. This is due to the interaction of
decision makers with more than two skill levels and does not occur when only two skill levels
are being exchanged (cf. Lemma 1). Thus, while a decision maker with a higher skill level is
always preferred to one with a lower skill, whether one pair of decision makers is preferred to
another having one more skilled and one less skilled decision maker, depends not only on the
skill levels of the two pairs of decision makers but also on the skill levels of the other decision
makers in the committee. In particular, if pairs of decision makers are exchanged between
symmetric committees, and the skill levels of the exchanged pair of decision makers have the
same geometric or arithmetic mean, i.e., if a = 0 or b = 0, then asymmetric committees are
always optimal for N = 5 and, depending on the skill levels of the other decision makers,
may be optimal for N ≥ 7.11
A practical implication of Theorem 2 is that it may not be possible to allocate the decision
makers sequentially such that, at each step, the average probability of making the correct
decisions is maximized for the committee size at that step. To illustrate, if the organization
starts out with two thee-member committees and two decision makers at each of three skill
levels, then Corollary 2 shows that one decision maker at each skill level should be allocated
to each of the committees. If, however, the organization subsequently wishes to switch to
ﬁve-member committees and hires four additional decision makers, with two decision makers
at each of two diﬀerent skill levels, it might then not be desirable to add one of each type
of the new decision makers to each committee. Rather, to obtain an optimal allocation of
decision makers, the organization might have to add all the new decision makers to one
11 If a = 0, the exchange of decision makers also leaves the geometric means of the committee members’
skill level unchanged; if b = 0, the exchange of the decision makers also leaves the arithmetic means of the
committee members’ skill level unchanged.
18committee and switch two existing decision makers from that committee to the other. The
upshot is that an organization that foresees a change in the size of the committees, but has
no ﬂexibility to switch decision makers between the committees, might be forced to choose
between an optimal allocation of decision makers with the current size of the committees
and an optimal allocation of decision makers with the future size of the committees.
5 Conclusion
Despite the obvious practical importance of determining how a given group of decision makers
with diﬀerent skill levels should be assigned to diﬀerent committees, this problem has not
previously been theoretically addressed. To ﬁll this gap in the literature, we have examined
the symmetric case of two independent committees of equal size that work in parallel and
have to decide on an equal number of independent proposals using a simple majority rule.
For each proposal, it is a priori equally likely that “acceptance” and “rejection” is the correct
decision, and the net beneﬁt from a correct decision is the same for all proposals.
We ﬁnd that, in general, it is not optimal to strive for a symmetric composition of
committees. That is, it may not be desirable to divide decision makers with diﬀerent skill
levels evenly among committees. However, if decision makers have only two skill levels,
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